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This project examines the global connections, and disconnections, that fostered a globally 
mobile class of young Japanese radicals during the last four decades of the twentieth century. The 
aim is to understand how an influential minority of young working-class Japanese who experienced 
unprecedented high standards of living, educational attainment, and leisure time and yet nevertheless 
elected to fire a gun, throw a grenade, or gas a subway in advocacy for a religious or political movement. 
Importantly, there is a larger social question at work here in that despite clear global convergences of 
modernity, youth, and radical politics scholars have yet to construct a historically informed interpretive 
framework for discussing this transnational and perhaps trans-epochal phenomenon. Not all political 
violence is born of religious fervor, and not all young radicals are of Middle Eastern descent. The highly 
industrialized societies of Europe, the Americas and Pacific Asia have generated a significant share of 
the world’s angry youth whether they be Islamic extremists, Communist revolutionaries or Neo-Fascist 
thugs.  By looking at Japan there is the potential to better understand the globality of youth radicalism in 
a historical context that moves beyond the contemporary obsession with Islamic fundamentalism. 
Many Europeans and Americans, and most Japanese for that matter, naïvely think of the 
Japanese after 1945 as politically passive and unlikely to become directly involved in radical politics. 
Yet the late twentieth century is demarcated by significant points when normal, everyday Japanese 
people individually and collectively took direct, radical political action – from the 17-year old who 
assassinated the president of the Japan Socialist Party in 1960 to the 18 million youth who took to the 
streets, occupied their schools and universities, and besieged parliament to demonstrate their opposition 
to Japan’s involvement in the Vietnam War in 1968. Indeed, small bands of dedicated young radicals 
have pushed and prodded the Japanese state since the 1850s. From the assassinations committed by 
the Isshin-shishi (‘Men of High Purpose’) of the 1850s and 1860s to the young fascists who launched a 
string of unsuccessful coup d’états during the 1930s to the hijackings and airport attacks by leftist terror 
groups during the 1970s and 1980s, the apparent political status quo of contemporary Japan is in no 
small way the result of a century and a half of sporadic eruptions of political violence perpetrated by 
young Japanese men and women. 
While it is unfortunate that non-specialists often overlook the growing base of studies of popular 
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political opposition in modern Japan, more important is that scholars of modern Japan have still paid 
insufficient attention to the impact of gender, generation and class differentiations in the ways that 
extremist politics also shaped the political contours of twentieth century Japan. This history of radical 
youth politics in postwar Japan enables a better understanding of radicalized youth within the context 
of the global idea flows that precipitated a peculiar confluence of Mao-ism, black nationalism and 
Palestinian liberation in young leftists’ re-interpretations of Marx-Leninism in the late 1960s and early 
1970s; the neo-Fascist iconographies, and political associations, of mobsters and motorcycle youth 
gangs of the 1980s; and the trans-national religious mélange at the center of terror attacks perpetrated by 
the Aum Shinrikyo cult in the mid-1990s.
Politicians and bureaucrats navigated their shared interest in the social welfare of young people 
alongside their fear that young people also constituted a serious threat to social stability. From the late 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the Japanese state responded to youth radicalism with measured 
amounts of co-option and repression, but the constitutional democracy from the mid-twentieth century 
limited the extent to which the state could deploy its customary toolbox of suppressive tactics while 
simultaneously imbuing young people with specific inalienable rights. No longer children, but not yet 
fully emancipated adults, young people in postwar Japan learned to express their subjectivity during an 
intense period of successive cultural movements and political crises that ran parallel to the experiences 
of young people in the highly-industrialized nations of Western Europe and the Americas.
 The Japanese state responded to its ‘youth problem’ with formal and informal modes of 
suppression that included selective intimidation and even the recruitment of underworld groups with 
strong ties to right-wing parties who, with American backing, enthusiastically allied with a select group 
of neo-nationalists and neo-fascists, as they ‘struck back’ at ‘Communist insurgencies’ first thought 
born in the Soviet Union, then believed to be fomented by the People’s Republic of China, and finally 
thought to be controlled by North Korea. Their success at knocking out leftist youth groups in Japan, 
and corresponding indirect encouragement of neo-nationalist agendas, was such that by the end of the 
1990s most Japanese had come to believe that youth radicalism was a thing of the past.
In recovering the narrative of radical politics in which Japanese youth participated this book 
examines the political discourses produced by and for young blue-collar men and women – from 
the weekly rants found in the sports, gambling, pornography and politics magazine Shūkan Taishū 
(Weekly Masses) to the political subject embedded within the comic book series Kyōtei Shōjo (Motor-
boat Racer Girl). Analyzed alongside diplomatic, police and intelligence reports collected from the 
national archives of Japan, Great Britain and the United States as well as ephemera gleaned from the 
archives of the Takazawa Collection at the University of Hawai’i in Manoa and the Ōhara Institute for 
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Social Research at Hōsei University in Tokyo, these sources offer a unique means of moving beyond 
methodological nationalism by investigating Japan as a conjunction point for the global ﬂow of ideas 
and peoples that shaped the Cold War world, and defined the late twentieth century. 
By focusing specifically on young radicals of blue-collar origins, this book breaks from 
conventional studies of Japanese youth and political violence that have tended to blame the ennui of 
affluence for several waves of youth radicalism since 1960. High-profile acts of political violence 
committed by young Japanese of blue-collar origins illustrate that social alienation in a highly 
industrialized society, such as Japan, is born of a complex interchange of material, social, political 
and psychological conditions. This book argues that the severity and social impact of these acts of 
political violence also had the inadvertent effect of lending credibility to further levels of social and 
legal repression that did not redress the extent to which some young people were push/pulled to acts 
of religio-political extremism, but instead precipitated further levels of social alienation that enhanced 
the attraction of violence. This book concludes by examining the extent to which severely diminished 
employment, educational, and training opportunities for youth aged 16 to 24 has since the 1990s 
combined with intensified levels of social repression of ‘odd youth’ to trigger high rates of atomized 
(non-collective) anti-social behaviors informed by video games, animated films, and comic book series 
with extreme political themes. Indeed, the Japanese state’s successful suppression of heterodoxic 
religious and political movements helped to foster an involution of violence that manifested in a 
subset of youth who expressed their anger inward as violence against themselves, their family, or their 
classmates.1
Studies of youth and youth politics in modern Japan, and global youth politics from the 1960s 
to the 1980s generally, overlook the extent to which young blue-collar men and women participated 
in radical political movements, right- and left-wing, all through the postwar era.2 Many politicians and 
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pundits assert that radical youth politics in Japan died-out during the 1980s, but their assertions belie the 
extent to which right-wing hate groups and fringe religio-political movements continued to attract young 
people well into the 1990s.3 Recent studies of Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami investigate 
a rise in youth activism in apparent opposition to the rightward turn of the Japanese state within the 
context of decreasing social and economic opportunity.4 Other recent scholarship suggests that the 
scarcity of work and educational opportunities since the end of the 1990s has created a generationally 
stratified precariat comprised of the first Japanese since 1945 to face the prospects of a lifetime of 
diminishing opportunity and economic disadvantage.5  Neither recent trend in youth studies looks closely 
at the ways in which class and gender have impacted the choice by different age cohorts to join radical 
groups and or engage in political violence.
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